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A. INTRODUCTION

Earnscliffe Research and Communications is pleased to present this report to the
Independence Standards Board (ISB). It is based on a second phase of research
conducted for the Board and focuses upon key questions that remained to be
answered after our initial work, reported on last year. There were a few specific
hypotheses to be tested:


Many of those interviewed in the first phase of research felt that the pressures to
adopt aggressive earnings management techniques may vary depending on the
size of the company, and on the sector in which its business was focussed. The
hypothesis was that pressures from volatile markets and impatient investors
might be more acutely felt in regard to mid or smaller cap companies, or
technology sector companies.
Accordingly, this second phase of inquiry focussed on SEC registrants with
market capitalization of greater than $250 million, but below the Fortune 500
threshold. The sample tilted towards companies in new sectors of the economy,
including technology, telecommunications, the Internet, and entertainment, and
some publicly traded companies which have little or no track record of
profitability, but for who market capitalization has been substantial to date.



In the first phase of the research, a number of participants suggested that
auditing firms other than the very largest might be exposed to greater pressures
in respect of their independence. Accordingly, engagement partners selected
included roughly half from big 5 and half from non big 5 audit firms, all working
on audits of small to mid cap and technology-oriented companies.



In our first phase of research, some audiences expressed a desire to better
understand what a “responsible individual investor” might feel about the issues
at stake. Consequently, we conducted focus groups among people who might be
considered “responsible investors”: those who personally were significantly
involved in managing their own portfolios, whose trading habits reveal a longer
term orientation, and who try to consume as much information as possible about
the companies they choose to own. Eight focus groups were conducted in Austin,
Boston, San Francisco and Chicago with such investors.

As with the first phase of research the primary objective was to assess the
perceptions of different audiences around the concept of auditor independence and
objectivity. As part of the enquiry, interviewees were asked to consider whether they
thought a problem currently did exist, what the ideal mix of safeguards would be, and
which priorities they would set for the future in this area.
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Both the interviews and focus groups followed a semi-structured agenda, ensuring
that each interview or group captured a certain amount of essential information, but
also allowing the interviewees latitude to take the interview in a direction that
reflected their personal experiences and perspectives. The interview guide and focus
group moderator’s guides used are attached to this report as Appendix B and C.
A total of 51 one on one interviews were conducted, in roughly equal measure from
the following segments:
CEO’s of SEC registrant companies

9

CFO’s of SEC registrants

11

Chairs of audit committees of such companies

10

Buy side investment analysts

10

Audit partners

11

Interviews drawn from the five groups were done in person or on the phone, based
on the preference of the interviewee.
Bruce Anderson, Principal and a founding partner of the Earnscliffe Strategy Group,
Canada’s best-respected public affairs firm, designed and led the research program.
Questions and comments are welcomed and may be addressed to him directly, at
613-233-8080, or by email at anderson@earnscliffe.ca
We would like to acknowledge the helpful guidance of the ISB Board, and the
considerable assistance of the ISB staff, led by Art Siegel, in the development and
execution of this project.
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B. ONE ON ONE INTERVIEWS

THE STATE OF FINANCIAL REPORTING
As with the first phase of research, each interview began with a discussion of the
participant’s view of the quality and reliability of the financial reporting system in the
US. Despite both the sectoral and size differences in the companies from which the
sample was drawn, the results were remarkably similar to the first group of
interviewees.


Interviewees felt very confident and satisfied with the general standard of
financial reporting in the US.



Most believed that publicity about cases of financial misrepresentation was
increasing, but that the actual incidence of such behavior was not necessarily on
the rise.



Most felt that the level of integrity of those involved in financial reporting was
adequate. Occasional misdeeds were not seen as part of a broader
phenomenon of declining morality. Equally, it should be noted, there was no buyin to the notion that auditors were more moral than other actors.



Roughly half felt that financial reporting requirements were becoming more
complex, bordering on unreasonably complex. Most felt that the changes
required in financial reporting made the output less suited to the needs of retail
investors, and of mixed value to institutional investors.
KEY FINDING

FINANCIAL REPORTING IS GENERALLY WELL REGARDED
Reasons:
 Basic human nature, honesty, integrity
 Fear of civil and criminal penalties
 Rules, regulations, standards, oversight, sanctions
 Desire for ongoing access to capital



Audited financials, while an important foundation for analyzing a company’s
prospects are less central to investment decisions than they were in the past.

In summary, most of those interviewed in this second phase of research offered
similar views to those found in the initial research work. There was a generally high
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level of confidence in financial reporting, and a sense that the system of safeguards
was functioning reasonably well, despite the high profile of some misdeeds. One
important exception to this general consensus was among analysts, auditors and
some management interviewees who displayed more unease about the pressures
affecting the technology sector. This exception will be dealt with later in this report.
THE BROAD VIEW OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Perceptions of the role and performance of auditors were also highly similar to those
gathered initially. To summarize:


Most had a positive view of auditors and the way in which they performed their
jobs. They were seen as competent and professional, and conducted audits with
a high standard of objectivity and independence.
KEY FINDING

AUDITORS ARE SEEN TO BE MEETING A HIGH STANDARD OF INDEPENDENCE
Reasons:
 Personal attributes including training, integrity
 Instinct to protect reputation, avoid penalties
 Appropriate behavior by most clients



Most felt that the risks of unfavorable perceptions of auditor independence are
growing, due largely to the provision of non-audit services to auditees. While
auditors remain mostly of the view that current safeguards will be adequate,
others are of a different view, and believe additional safeguards are probably
needed.
KEY FINDING

PRESSURES ON THE PERCEPTION OF INDEPENDENCE ARE GROWING
Reasons:
 Competition for capital in volatile, momentum oriented markets
 Auditors selling consulting services to auditees
 More intense scrutiny by media, regulators

In a nutshell, most feel that audits are not compromised today, but that more may
need to be done to avoid a deterioration in the perception of auditor independence in
the future, especially where auditors provide non audit services to auditees.
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NON AUDIT SERVICES
As in the first round of research, detailed probing was conducted into the perceived
pressures on auditor independence. The main findings:


When accounting firms only did audit work, the risk of impairment was judged
acceptable, because the audit firm was presumed to care more deeply about its
reputation for quality audit work.



Most believe that accounting firms today are not indifferent about their
reputation for quality audits, but are more focused on raising the profile,
reputation, and profitability of non-audit services.



Many took the position that these pressures were not simply a function of audit
firms drive for growth, but that auditees were responsible as well. They noted two
factors: The drive to limit fees for audits; and the fact that many auditees
specifically ask their audit firms to accept consulting assignments.
KEY FINDING

NON AUDIT SERVICES SOLD TO AUDITEES POSE PERCEPTION CHALLENGES
 Audit firms seem more preoccupied with consulting reputation, revenues
 Some clients demand consulting services, audit fee cutbacks
 How would angry shareholders perceive this, after a setback.



The situations where consulting assignments were more likely to raise concerns
about independence are illustrated below:
KEY FINDING

SOME CONSULTING SITUATIONS TRIGGER GREATER CONCERNS
 Where fees greatly or routinely exceed audit fees
 Where contracts are assigned rather than bid competitively
 Where assignment is of a nature to become potential audit subject
 Where assignment is key to a firm, partner or office’s future strategy
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EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Findings on the question of earnings management were similar to the first round of
research, with some specific exceptions (buy side analysts and tech sector related)
noted later. The general view can be summarized as follows:
1. Earnings management is not a new phenomenon, but has more profile and
sensitivity given the long running bull market.
2. Half feel that earnings management efforts are more aggressive today, while the
other half dispute that assertion.
3. Many say that earnings management efforts are assumed and taken into
account by the market, and do not therefore distort the price of the equities
involved.
4. Many made the point that the real effort is to massage expectations, rather than
earnings. While they said that this was inappropriate, they also said that the
actual figures being reported were painting an accurate picture of the financial
health of the company involved.
5. Very few believe that auditors have much to do with aggressive earnings
management efforts, because they are not heavily involved in quarterly reporting,
and would not go along with aggressive practices even if they were.
KEY FINDING
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT MORE SENSITIVE, BUT NOTHING NEW
 Often factored in by market watchers, analysts
 Doesn’t usually involve auditors, or reflect on their image
 More worrisome where auditor-auditee are size mismatched
 More feeling of concern vis a vis the technology sector

6. There was a general consensus that earnings management issues were more
legitimate where auditors are smaller and clients are larger (seen as rare and
therefore more of a theoretical issue), and in relation to new sectors of the
economy, and in particular, new participants in those sectors. Mostly, this latter
point was based on a view that there was more room for interpretation of
accounting rules and standards, and that the market rewards and penalties for
tech stocks put more pressure on integrity. But a number of participants said
that auditors couldn’t help but be aware of the fact that missing targets carried a
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huge penalty and exceeding targets carried a huge upside for their clients,
something that was unusual to this sector, and a cause for concern.
In summary, earnings management is seen as inappropriate, but not new, not
unmanageable, and mostly not related to the work of auditors. Concerns are more
notable with respect to new players in new sectors of the economy, and more
findings in this area will be discussed later in this report.
CURRENT INDEPENDENCE SAFEGUARDS
Other than those with auditing experience, few had any detailed knowledge about the
safeguards that exist today. However, many sensed that current safeguards might
be insufficient to sustain the perception of the independence of auditors. There
were, as in the initial phase of probing, important differences by segment:


Auditors generally felt that current safeguards were adequate or needed only
slight fine-tuning.



Audit committee chairs tended to see safeguards as work in progress, requiring
constant attention, and continuous improvement.



Auditees assumed that current safeguards were probably appropriate, but were
concerned about protecting their reputation, and inclined to the idea that more
guidance might be useful.



Analysts felt that the current safeguards were all necessary and functioning
reasonably well, but they also believed that the non-audit services question might
require further safeguards, and that the traditional accounting rules applied to
technology companies represent a particular challenge. This point was not so
much about the independence of auditors, but rather the huge stakes and lack of
history in evaluating the technology sector.
KEY FINDING

LOW AWARENESS, LITTLE CRITICISM OF CURRENT SAFEGUARDS
 Apart from auditors, few know much about in-firm safeguards
 More awareness would help reduce apprehensions
 Rising scrutiny, non-audit services may signal need for more guidance

In summary, most respondents generally held that a combination of prevention and
re-mediation safeguards that were in place were performing a useful role, even if
they were unfamiliar with the details of all of them (Auditors clearly were familiar with
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the safeguards and had even greater confidence in them). The entry of audit firms
into consulting was seen as logical and unlikely to create a real problem of audit
independence, but the potential for appearance problems was seen as significant.
As a result, many assumed that safeguards may need to be updated in this area.
Separately, many sensed that the technology sector represents a particular
challenge, not because of lax ethics, or independence safeguards, but as a
consequence of the tremendous stakes, the lack of historical guidance about this
part of the economy, and the question of whether accounting rules fit this sector as
well as they fit others.
POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS
A fair bit of probing was done to determine what interviewees felt should be priorities
for change in the area of independence safeguards. Accepting as a starting point
that not all audiences were equally convinced that change, or much change was
needed, the main findings were again quite similar with those unearthed in the first
phase of our work. They can be summarized as follows:


The broad majority felt that there are too many “gray” areas where the role of
auditor as consultant to their audit clients is concerned.



There was a feeling that a combination of measures aimed at avoidance of
objectivity issues as well as measures aimed at remedying situations once they
arose was the best approach. As people voiced this opinion, it was clear that
they felt that the burden of trying to anticipate and avoid every potential problem
would be too severe or costly. Therefore, people tended to the view that if new
measures were needed, it might be more appropriate to focus on:
i.

Guidance on how to manage (traditional and new) situations that develop so
that independence is not lost or would not be seen to be lost

ii. Tougher sanctions for inappropriate behavior to act as a deterrent and to
reassure the investor community that the issue will be taken seriously by all
stakeholders in the future.


Many advocated a requirement of full disclosure as a way to both deter an
unhealthy relationship between auditor and client, and to inform investors of any
risks related thereto. Some were more enthusiastic about this than others, but
almost everyone favored disclosure over prohibition type approaches.



Most preferred the idea of setting forth broad principles, which should underpin
the relationship between auditor and client. Alongside these broad principles,
many endorsed the idea of developing a series of “best practices” advisories.
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KEY FINDING
A VARIETY OF SAFEGUARD ENHANCEMENTS DEEMED WORTHWHILE
 Fewer gray areas, more clarification, better communication
 Broad principles and best practices, not bright lines
 Greater disclosure, stronger audit committees
 Review existing rules, add and subtract as necessary
 Review audit firm internal practices



While a significant minority of interviewees felt that the best ultimate solution to
the independence question would be for consulting and audit practices to
separate, few anticipated that this would happen in the short term, if at all.
Therefore, they focussed on where additional clarifications or safeguards might
help, such as:
i.

Guidance on the nature and size of consulting assignments that pose greater
or lesser risk.

ii. Guidance on the best practices for relationship management, marketing of
consulting services, and partner compensation related thereto.
KEY FINDING
GREATER PRECISION SOUGHT AROUND NON-AUDIT WORK
 Nature of marketing and selling activities
 Nature of services which should not be offered to audit clients
 Size or thresholds for audit vs. non-audit fees
 Appropriate role of audit partners
 Compensation for audit partners
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ESTABLISHING A “PERCEPTION” TEST
Perhaps the most overwhelming consensus was the belief that the perception of
auditor independence is as critical to the integrity of the financial system, as is the
reality. At the same time, few could imagine a reasonable way to establish
safeguards around the idea of perceptions.


Virtually all interviewees felt that poor perceptions of the reliability or credibility of
audited financial statements could be damaging to the efficiency of capital
markets, regardless of whether there was actual auditor impairment or not. Most
felt that, rightly or wrongly, perceptions affected behavior in the marketplace and
therefore could not be ignored.



Many worried about what they viewed as “nonsense” litigation and unhealthy
skepticism about the state of financial reporting, which they thought could arise
from such misperceptions.



A number of people suggested that growing concerns about perception were
largely a function of the proliferation of media coverage of financial affairs, which
one auditor termed “a sit-com of financial reporting”. Others pointed to the
concomitant increase in investor interest and participation in the markets.
KEY FINDING
PERCEPTION CRITICAL, BUT DIFFICULT TO ADDRESS
 Broader market participation, evolution of economy raises risks
 Desire to take reasonable precautions, but to avoid overreaction
 Perception safeguards can only partly work, often have downsides
 Desire is to define a reasonable perception standard



While most sensed a growing debate about perception, many worried that it was
impossible to fully meet a perception standard, since it was “very tough to
measure when you had crossed the perception line”. While many were inclined
to agree with one CFO, who concluded “if the you deal with the actual, then the
perception will follow”, others felt that this approach would be insufficient, given
the level of media coverage of problems, and the skepticism which it creates.



Almost half of the sample offered the view that trying to meet a perception test
could be limiting, burdensome and would impose unreasonable costs on
accounting firms. Still others were concerned that the instinct to address
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perception issues might result in either excessive or ambiguous regulation of the
profession. This was seen as yet another disincentive to attract, retain and
nurture talented people within the profession. One analyst argued that “such a
drive towards purity will impair the process”.


While perception was seen as critical to virtually everyone interviewed, most
interviewees thought that some attention had to be paid to which particular
audience’s perceptions needed addressing. Many pointed to the increasing
numbers of unsophisticated, individual investors. They worried about the ability
of many of these investors to make reasonable judgements about the reliability
and content financial statements, let alone the independence of auditors. As one
audit chair noted, there is “such a different set of “they” holding these
perceptions now”, with varying degrees of economic literacy and financial
sophistication.

In short, most felt that while perception was becoming a more important variable in
auditor independence, there were risks in both ignoring the issue, or in trying to set
standards that focused too heavily on meeting a perception test. On balance, most
felt that it would be useful to try and establish some objective standard of acceptable
perception, assuming a certain amount of responsibility lay with the investor to be
reasonably informed, and taking into account the idea that reality is the most
fundamental test of all.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF SECTOR TO AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
A large number of interviewees felt that emerging sectors of “the new economy”,
(especially those in the technology field) where the application of longstanding
accounting standards may permit or require more “judgement calls” could pose
unique risks to the perception and perhaps to the reality of the role of the auditor.
The key findings in this area are as follows:


Most did not believe that there was any greater tendency on the part of people in
the technology sector to act inappropriately.



While people in the technology sector were seen as having no lesser ethical
standards than others, there were real concerns about financial reporting in this
sector. These seemed to be mostly tied to two factors:
i.

The unusually high rewards and penalties applied to the financial reporting in
this sector meant that the individuals were placed under unusually great
pressures.
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ii. The application of traditional accounting rules to these new sectors was seen
to allow more latitude and demand more interpretation than in other sectors.


Internet start-ups were seen as especially vulnerable to potential problems.
In large measure, this was viewed as a function of the relative newness of
both the lines of business and the accounting rules which governed their
operation. As one CEO put it, “the Internet has no history, so you can’t create
rules”. The rapidly shifting technology landscape creates its own complexity
that is seen by many as “leaving more room for inappropriate behavior”.
KEY FINDING
TECHNOLOGY SECTOR A CAUSE FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF CONCERN
 Not because of a perception of ethical weakness
 But due to uncertainties about the business model, flexibility in accounting
 Concern heightened by huge market swings, valuations
 Many new companies lack infrastructure, talent, want to rely on audit firm



Many interviewees questioned how there could be effective financial reporting
when there are no revenues to report, while others countered that this was
simply a new economic reality, and failures were more due to anachronistic
accounting rules than illegitimate behavior. Many added that tech companies
were often far more conservative than they needed to be in their financial
reporting, because they were so keenly aware of regulatory scrutiny and investor
skepticism.



The key issue for those on both sides of the argument was the ability of the audit
profession to contribute to accurate valuations of these sorts of companies. As
one audit chair put it, “these companies are simply running at a speed that the
auditors don’t understand”. For him, like many others, the real challenge was
establishing “value in kind” by accurately addressing what items were recognized
and what were expensed.



Another audit chair of a “dot.com” was at pains to express how ill equipped the
accounting rules were to deal with issues such as “goodwill” within technology
companies. He cited Microsoft as a classic example of a company with few
physical assets but enormous intellectual property, and therefore significant and
fundamental value.
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Most agreed that the transition from unprofitable to profitable can be a very
painful one for these companies, but that once profitable the more traditional
rules of valuation and accounting could apply.



Revenue recognition, especially in software companies, was seen as a very
ambiguous area. Some noted the fact that many tech companies book 75% of
their business in the third month of each quarter, suggesting significant pressure
to book sales to meet quotas late in the quarter, regardless of when they take
place.



R&D cost allocation within tech companies was seen as another “gray” area,
where auditors could exercise far too much discretion in the minds of a
considerable number of people interviewed. This was cited as especially true for
the capitalization of “in-process” R&D costs during merger and acquisition
activity. Still others suggested that the newness of tech companies had lead to a
great deal of inconsistency in the application of accounting rules, especially in the
ways to define the “costs of goods sold”.



One very specific challenge to auditor independence within the technology
sector was regarding systems integration firms, which help companies build
content delivery architecture. These companies are faced with the unique
dilemma of having to partner on accounts with accounting firms frequently.
Audit firms are clearly critical to the selection of software processes for many
clients. As such, these companies felt they needed a formal letter of
independence from their auditors ensuring that their consulting and audit
arms are totally separate.



Still others pointed to both a lack of human resources and expertise in many
technology companies where the management were highly intelligent, frequently
young and often with little or no background in financial matters. One auditor
noted that the audit firm was reduced to doing routine bookkeeping for a dot.com
start-up because management lacked even basic accounting skills.



Biotechnology companies were viewed as relatively easy to audit by some, but
others noted that the disclosure and description of what stage products are at
could be technically complex to understand and therefore potentially
problematic.



Finally, a number of interviewees across various segments suggested
accounting was more complex and therefore potentially more problematic in
industries like aerospace, where longer-term procurement contracts made
significant estimations of profitability necessary.
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In summary, it was clear that many respondents feel that there are more risks of
audit problems in the technology sector than in more traditional sectors of the
economy. At the same time, these risks are not linked to a perception that
ethical standards might be more lax, but rather that some of the traditional
safeguards, such as accounting rules and standards, may apply too loosely or
allow too much room for discretion, putting investors at greater risk than they
may assume.
THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMPANY SIZE TO INDEPENDENCE
One of the hypotheses to be tested in this phase of the research was whether
the largest cap companies were more likely to take a more conservative
approach, and smaller cap companies were more likely to favor aggressive
accounting, and whether this had any impact on auditors. The key findings
around this hypothesis can be summarized as follows:


For most interviewees size was a double-edged sword. They were equally able
to imagine the potential for abuses in either scenario. The consensus
seemed to be that the corporate culture was the most important determinant
of ethical behavior on the part of management and outside auditors.



Larger cap companies were viewed as having more significant internal
control mechanisms and more sophisticated information systems, which
allowed for better financial reporting. On the other hand, they were seen as
more complex entities to audit and more important to the audit firm in terms
of fees and reputation. Accordingly, pressures to retain such clients at any
cost might be greater.



Smaller cap companies were seen as often easier to audit, but also less
stable in terms of their financial performance. Auditors observed that they
tended to be much closer to their clients in smaller companies, which relied
on them for a range of strategic and accounting advice. This could prove to
be beneficial, by increasing their knowledge of the company’s operations; but
could also prove to be difficult, by making the relationship too close.

Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board

- 15 -

July 2000

EARNSCLIF FE RESEARCH
& COMMUNI CATI ONS

KEY FINDING
SIZE UNLIKELY TO AFFECT INDEPENDENCE ISSUES
 Larger companies have more control systems, but are more complex to audit and
are more important to firms.
 Smaller companies easier to audit, but more prone to swings
 Start-ups, smaller caps probably the area of most evident concern, especially if
expectations around growth rates are high



The often urgent need for capital in start-ups and smaller companies led
interviewees to assume that some of these companies were under huge
pressure to perform and consequently would exert significant pressure on
auditors to allow them to hit their earnings targets. One auditor noted that
some start-ups are only able to pay their audit fees if an IPO succeeds or
bank financing comes through. This clearly could place unusual pressure
upon auditors to ensure that the numbers were favorable to the company’s
investors.



Some suggested that it would be wiser to focus on companies with greater
then normal growth rates, who are trying to distinguish themselves by being
acquisitions intensive.

In summary, there was a tendency to believe that mid caps were not much
different from large cap companies, where issues affecting auditor
independence were concerned. However, smaller cap companies, especially
start-ups, were seen to present some unique challenges, which may require
more guidance.
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C. KEY SEGMENT DIFFERENCES

As the various sections of this report have noted, the audience segments for this
study had different perspectives on a number of matters. This section of the report
will summarize in one place the nature of these differences.
CEO’S


This was a more homogeneous group of CEO’s then was interviewed in the initial
phase. Most felt that the quality and reliability of financial statements were quite
high, despite the constant struggle to find the appropriate balance between
meaningful disclosure and the need to protect competitive advantage.



They shared a sense that the demands for information were growing both in
terms of the amount of detail and time sensitivity being required by regulators
and the market.



They felt that standards of corporate governance were rising and that this had
generally led to stronger relationships with outside auditors. They acknowledged
that a degree of rapport with the auditor was necessary and beneficial.



Some felt that there was not a real problem of auditor independence, but that
there was a growing perception issue, that should be addressed. They
understood perceptions of auditor independence to be critical to the overall
health of the financial system, and felt poor perceptions could be extremely
damaging, whether real or not.
KEY FINDING
CEOS SAY REPORTING IS IMPROVING, PERCEPTIONS UNDER PRESSURE
 Relationships with auditors are valued, work well, abuses rare
 But consolidation of accounting firms, rising scrutiny raises stakes
 Not expert on safeguards, lack a clear consensus on how best to proceed
 Internet companies seen as a particular challenge



Some raised concerns about the degree of consolidation in the accounting field,
noting that they had very few choices among audit and consulting suppliers. But
others argued that the economies of size and collective experience meant that
Big 5 firms provided a better, more reliable audit service.
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By far, the major focus of their concern was the purchase of consulting services
from the auditing firm. They were deeply concerned about the legal and ethical
exposure created by having too significant a relationship with their audit firm, and
often troubled by the issue of compensation to audit partners in such an
instance. Views about how best to approach the matter included:
i.

Many argued that the flexibility to procure consulting services from their audit
firm should be reduced or even eliminated. Many preferred to simply disallow
their audit firm from bidding on consulting work.

ii. Many felt that reliance on Chinese Walls was inadequate, but that mandating
more fundamental separation of the audit and consulting services was
impractical.
iii. Several suggested that an increased reliance on disclosure and on review by
audit committees might be the best available option.


CEO’s generally felt that the current pressure to manage earnings was huge, but
that actual abuses were extremely rare. They acknowledged that the real
responsibility for meeting the street’s expectations lay with management and not
the auditors. They were sympathetic to the notion that it was neither cost
effective nor possible to audit “down to the penny” and were disturbed by the
perceived demands of analysts and the SEC that they and their auditors do so.



They suggested that some companies might be more susceptible to pressures on
auditor independence. These included Internet companies where there were
issues of real accounting inconsistency and revenue recognition, smaller
companies without the infrastructure to monitor their financials effectively, and
newer companies engaged in IPO’s and second tranche offerings.

Ultimately, the CEO’s felt that a combination of measures would be necessary to
ease challenges of perception and reality. They saw the need for clearer guidance in
some areas, and perhaps some new safeguards but fundamentally felt that “you
can’t legislate morality”. Most saw the tone set at the top of accounting firms as
crucial to maintaining independence. Audit committees were seen as an important
tool but one that should not supplant the role of management. Virtually all agreed on
the need for strong sanctions, so that when and if there was a breach of
independence rules, severe penalties would apply.
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CFO’S
This group was again fairly homogeneous on some issues, and showed clear
divergence on others.


They were largely unconvinced that auditor independence was under real
pressure, but they did feel that there were perception problems and that this was
a troubling development.



CFO’s generally saw their relationship with their auditors as helpful, but more as
“a validation of what management was doing” than as a value-added. While they
thought the quality of the financial statements was high, they also acknowledged
that both the quantity of information provided and the degree of accompanying
“spin” made them less relevant to investors then they once were.



A number raised concerns about the degree of consolidation in the accounting
field, noting that fewer firms meant fewer choices. Others noted that the “Big 5”
had become so big, that it was more difficult to effectively manage and police
independence issues. But others argued that size was a safeguard of
independence, since no one client was so important as to jeopardize the firm’s
reputation.



Most CFO’s took a restrictive view towards hiring their audit firm to do non-audit
work.
KEY FINDING
CFOS SAY REALITY FINE, PERCEPTIONS MORE TROUBLING
 Audits seen to validate management efforts, more than add value
 Consolidation of accounting firms raises challenges
 Wanted flexibility, but showed instinct to restrict relationships with auditors
 Internet companies seen as a particular challenge



Many resented any pressure to buy consulting services from their audit firm and
were troubled by the sense that engagement partners might be becoming
“account managers”.



Many felt that Chinese Walls provided some protection but an equal number saw
them as being too porous to be effective. Competitive bidding and close
monitoring of consulting assignments were seen as more helpful.

Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board

- 19 -

July 2000

EARNSCLIF FE RESEARCH
& COMMUNI CATI ONS



Earnings management was acknowledged as a reality of current market
conditions, but most CFOs felt that the SEC was exaggerating the extent of the
problem. Indeed many seemed to feel that “auditors were becoming fall guys”
and that while the pressure on companies to meet expectations were real, most
auditors were only exercising their professional judgement within GAAP.



Most did feel that some companies were more open to issues of auditor
independence. Most frequently cited were Internet companies where issues of
valuation, revenue recognition, costs of goods sold and fulfillment costs posed
unique challenges. Most felt that once “the street” started to focus more on
bottomline rather than topline revenues, these issues would be self-correcting.

CFO’s as a whole were deeply concerned about perception issues but felt that it was
important to ensure that a “reasonableness” test was applied in considering
safeguards. They favored a combination of both avoidance and management
safeguards. The majority favored rulemaking which stressed best practices over
bright lines, fearing a tendency to put in place rules that were too narrow, restrictive,
and ultimately counterproductive.
AUDITORS
As a group, auditors were fairly homogeneous in their views.


The general sentiment was that the quality of audits was improving over time, as
audit firms became more expert, and more able to bring a broader set of skills to
bear on behalf of a particular client.



At the same time, many felt that the growing complexity of the financial reporting
requirements raised costs and reduced the utility of financial statements for
many investors.



Most observed that the quality and reliability of financial statements was more a
function of the corporate culture than the size of the auditee. But a minority
expressed a view that the financial reporting of larger companies tended to be of
higher quality in part due to their greater degree of internal controls.



Sectoral differences were seen as important in that the technical complexity of
the audit might be greater in sectors where the accounting practices were
relatively untested (the technology sector) or where longer term procurement
contracts made booking revenues more problematic (the aerospace industry).
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KEY FINDING
AUDITORS SAY AUDITS IMPROVING, AMOUNT OF DETAIL COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
 Corporate culture matters to independence more than size of auditee
 New sectors raise issues where accounting practices are less tested
 Relationships seen as professional and well balanced
 But concerns about perceptions may mean tougher sanctions needed



Auditors saw their relationship with client companies as highly professional and
well balanced. Many indicated that their clients valued their ability to “push
back” but some others acknowledged that the pressure to meet street estimates
was causing somewhat greater tensions with clients. Many felt that smaller to
mid sized firms tended to be more reliant upon the auditor for advice. This was
seen as equally true of “start-up” companies, particularly in the “new economy”
sectors, where management financial expertise was not always as strong.



All shared the view that there was no significant rise in the incidence of
impairment. But most said that the pressures on independence perceptions,
triggered by the growth of consulting services and by the debate about earnings
management, were growing.



Virtually all shared a view that the pressures to meet earning estimates were
inordinate and a function of insatiable expectations by investors. A number felt
that they were being thrust into the role of investment analysts and resented
dealing with what they viewed as the irrational expectations of the market. At the
same time, very few felt that the pressure to meet street estimates translated
into independence impairments on the part of auditors.



Auditors differed somewhat in their perception of the effect of consulting services
on independence issues. Many saw consulting services as a relationship building
tool which provided significant value-added to the client and auditor alike. But
others expressed a concern that the rise of multi-disciplinary services imposed a
real cost to and effected a cultural shift within the firm.



Auditors felt that as a group they were properly trained and coached to maintain
the state of mind required providing proper attest services. But many
acknowledged that the size of large audit firms made it more challenging to
model and maintain appropriately behavior. Others pointed to the lack of
financial and human resources within smaller firms to accomplish this important
task.
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Most auditors felt that the degree and proliferation of media coverage and the
regulatory community itself had exaggerated the issues of independence and
audit failures. But they acknowledged that the perception of independence
issues was growing, at least within these two audiences and that those
perceptions needed to be addressed.



It was clear that perception issues were critical to the majority of auditors. Once
again, the notion that “integrity is the commodity which an audit firm sells” was
key. But there was considerable debate on how best to deal with perception
problems. Many argued that it was impossible to meet the perception burden
because it was unmeasurable. Others suggested that perhaps an objective
definition of perception, not unlike the “reasonable man” test, might be
necessary.



Auditors were concerned that they might have to consider altering their business
model, simply to avoid a perception problem, when the reality was that there was
no impairment. Indeed many argued that additional rules and “over-regulation”
would make it even more difficult to attract and retain young people to the
auditing practice. At the same time, most auditors felt that the independence
safeguards need to reflect a balance between avoidance and remediation.
Auditors felt that the tone established at the top of their firms and the use of
internal review and governance procedures were the most effective way to deal
with impairment issues.

In summary, relative to the previous phase of research, there seemed to be a
heightened view among this sample of auditors, that additional measures might be
necessary and helpful in defusing perception challenges. Preferred actions included
a clarification and modernization of some of the rules, publication of best practices,
and an expanded role for Audit Committees and education of investors about current
safeguards. Many were willing to support more severe sanctions or remedies, when
and if actual incidences of impairment occurred, in large part to deal with the
perception issues.
AUDIT COMMITTEE CHAIRS
This segment was fairly homogeneous in its views.


Most felt standards of financial reporting and of corporate governance had
improved over time. They felt that Audit Committees had greater importance,
and were more probing and diligent than before.



Most audit chairs saw themselves as having a private and professional
relationship with the audit firm. They speculated that relationships might vary
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according to the size and culture of the audit firms. One argued vigorously that a
fundamental conflict of interest resided in the fact that the company pays the
auditors for the attest function. Another suggested that audit firms were doing a
poor job in managing their reputation, especially in the key area of auditor
independence.


Generally, there was a consensus that the actual number of impairment
problems was probably not increasing, but that perception problems were
growing, something that this group found troubling.
KEY FINDING
AUDIT CHAIRS SEE IMPROVEMENTS, FEEL WELL SUPPORTED
 Impairment problems not growing, perception a matter of rising concern
 Non-audit services the biggest challenge, most prefer to avoid the scenario
 Expectations are that separation will be inevitable
 Most welcome more tools, support, guidance



Most argued that the sale of consulting services by the auditing firm was the
most problematic factor in perception terms, but there was little consensus on
how best to deal with the issue. Some felt Chinese Walls were inadequate, while
others suggested that firms had a massive incentive to make them work. Most
agreed that if the awarding of consulting contracts to the audit firm had a
material impact on the audit partner’s compensation, this was inappropriate.



Most felt that the SEC or the market itself would effectively force a separation of
the audit and consulting sides of accounting firms. In the interim, a fair number
felt that the sale of consulting services by the auditing firm to auditees should
simply be avoided.



The issue of earnings management troubled this group less, since they viewed it
more often as a manipulation of expectations, than earnings. They felt that
management was under enormous pressure to meet earnings estimates leading
many companies to adopt aggressive accounting practices. Nevertheless, many
noted that meeting the short-term expectations game did not change the
fundamental value of companies.



Some cited specific factors that they felt were more challenging than others,
including: recognition of good will, value in kind, the competition for capital on the
part of smaller companies, cost of goods, in-process R&D and revenue
recognition.
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Most audit chairs agreed that the role and standards of audit committees
needed to be strengthened, but many noted that they had no desire to assume
the role of management. These respondents worried that the additional time
commitment and legal exposure such an expansion of powers and
responsibilities implied would have a chilling effect on their desire and ability to
function effectively.



Generally, they favored an enhanced role for audit committees, fuller disclosure
practices, greater clarification of current guidelines, publication of best practices
to help provide guidance in new areas, and general principles rather than bright
lines. Virtually all these respondents were looking for practical tools to help
adjudge on these difficult issues. Some suggested a materiality matrix would be
useful.

The audit chairs generally favored safeguards that combined both avoidance and
remedial measures. Once again, there was a strong consensus that to be more
effective, rules needed to be more clearly enforced. Many audit chairs stressed the
need for meaningful sanctions, applied when necessary.
BUY SIDE ANALYSTS
Buy side analysts were not as homogeneous a group. Certainly those who had
previously worked as auditors were again influenced positively by that experience.
But real differences emerged in the analyst’s assessment of the magnitude of the
problem and the appropriate means to address the issues of auditor independence.


Once again, analysts tended to be more skeptical about auditor independence
then other respondents. While they were generally of the view that most financial
reporting could be trusted, they also identified wide variances in the quality of
audited financial statements. These variances were seen as a function of the
management style, longevity, size and the strength of control and information
systems of the company itself.



While some believed that the amount and quality of financial disclosure had
improved over time, others suggested it had changed for the worse, citing
restructuring charges as one specific area of abuse.
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KEY FINDING
BUY SIDE ANALYSTS MORE SCEPTICAL, BUT NOT OVERLY TROUBLED
 Audited statements declining in value over time
 Role of auditor has problems, but other issues are more significant
 Some accounting practices raise ire, but focus is not independence per se



Once again many analysts argued that the audited statements were of
modest and declining importance, especially compared to more timesensitive sources of data, and many noted the cost-cutting on audits as
evidence of their diminishing value.



Most tended to see the “typical” relationship between auditors and clients as
acceptable, although they frequently cited incidents of abuse. There was a
general view that the relationship was subject to corruption, because it was a
financial one, but that this potential was common in the financial markets,
and worse in relation to other players than with regard to auditors.



As a group, they were uncomfortable by the impact of consulting services upon
the traditional audit practice. Most sensed a real cultural shift within accounting
firms which rendered auditors “more value-added players than policemen”.



Virtually all worried about what they saw to be the inevitable and negative impact
of linking audit partners compensation to consulting services. There was little
consensus about whether “Chinese Walls” were an effective safeguard against
abuse, with a minority suggesting that only a total separation of audit and
consulting services would guarantee independence.



They recognized the phenomenon of earnings management as real but not
particularly new or noteworthy. They acknowledged that the bull market was
creating enormous pressures upon companies to meet the street’s estimates.
But they were less troubled by the notion of earnings management placing undue
pressures upon auditor independence, stating that the SEC had overstated the
problem and that accounting principles were sufficiently and appropriately
flexible to manage expectations, not to permit fraud.



They were able to differentiate company types which they viewed with a greater
potential to experience auditor independence issues. Technology companies
were cited frequently, especially with regards to the capitalization of “in-process”
R&D. Companies which required significant estimates of profitability, due to a
reliance on long term procurement contracts where accrual estimates are
necessary, were also identified.
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Even though they minimized the impact of financial statements, the analysts agreed
that perception was critical to an efficient capital market. And while they sensed that
the rules needed updating, there was little consensus on how to achieve a beneficial
result. Many worried that “over-regulation” would drive good people out of the
profession. But there was a strong sense that however the rules were changed, the
current enforcement penalties were not stringent enough.
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D. FOCUS GROUP FINDINGS

A total of 8 focus groups were conducted in four different locations (San Francisco,
Boston, Austin, and Chicago). The participants in these focus groups were selected
on the basis of several criteria:


That they had purchased stock in public companies in the last year.



That they did research of some sort personally about the companies whose
stock they might buy or sell.



That they were the type of investor who typically held stock for longer periods
of time, at least a year.

Using this selection criteria, the intent was to explore the perceptions of what
might be termed “reasonable investors”, that segment of the retail marketplace
whose views on the role of auditor could be helpful in considering guidelines in
the future.
The interview guide used in these focus groups was similar to the interview guide
employed in the one on one interviews conducted among elite audiences. To
some degree, it was necessary to reduce the amount of detail, and to probe
fewer complex concepts. Nonetheless, we are confident that the findings will
prove of interest, and take comfort in the fact that they were consistent across
the cities where the groups were held.
INVESTORS RESEARCH HABITS
At the outset of the groups, participants were asked to talk about the ways in
which they approached the question of how to choose which companies to invest
in, or when to sell stock they already held. The key findings can be summarized
this way:
1. The participants confirmed early in the discussions that they tended to have
modest sized portfolios (the older, the larger) and that their orientation was
long term. Many said that they had bought a number of stocks over the years
but had little if any experience selling stocks. They gravitated towards long
established companies, but also were involved in technology issues, leaning
towards the more established of these companies. They recognized that
stocks were volatile, but likely the best way to ensure the long-term growth of
their money.
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2. Most people reported using a number of different techniques to help them
decide upon their investments. Among the most frequently mentioned
sources of information were:


Print publications such as Money, Worth, Investors Business Daily, etc.
These were generally thought to be useful ways of getting access to a
large amount of information in a format that is easily digested.



Watching television programming such as that on CNBC and CNN.
Television coverage of market activity was primarily used not for long term
planning but for monitoring performance, although most said that they
listened to what prominent analysts said were their favorite stock picks,
and might consider doing more research on those companies.



Following the opinions and picks of analysts. These were considered to
be the most important single source of investment advice. People gained
access to analyst views in a number of different ways, including via their
brokers, from media sources, and from on-line free or subscription
services. In offering their views on analyst information, participants were
quick to point out that they understood their vulnerabilities, but they felt
that the typical analyst was in a better position than others to provide
objective, detailed analysis of a company’s prospects.



Consulting friends, family and colleagues: While this was not considered
the most reliable source of guidance, it was clearly the most widely
practiced behavior. Most of those interviewed said that they had one or a
small handful of trusted friends, or relatives, who they felt knew a fair bit
about the market, and could be counted on for some combination of hot
tips and conservative counsel.



Consulting a broker or financial adviser: Most of those interviewed had
currently, or had in the past, a broker with whom they dealt. However, a
relatively small number of people cited retail brokers as a valuable source
of information, except as a conduit for gaining access to a brokerage’s
research services.

CONSUMERS RELY ON MANY SOURCES, LOOKING FOR BUY IDEAS
 Many different media are utilized, Internet quite heavily
 Past performance, familiar names and products part of screen
 Established companies preferred, tech companies included in mix
 Analyst views are important, sourced a number of ways
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Using a variety of Internet-based techniques: including engines like
Yahoo, corporate websites, brokerage or fund company websites, and
self-help sites like Motley Fool. A considerable number of those
interviewed were using the Internet, and most were enthusiastic about its
potential to help them make informed decisions. Again, the main tactic
they used to filter the information was to rely more on past stock
performance, companies that were generally known to them, and the
views of senior analysts from institutions that they were familiar with. A
small number of those interviewed reported visiting chat centers to
discuss and hear views about stocks, but for most this was not all that
appealing.



Subscribing to newsletters such as Kiplinger’s. A minor, but not miniscule
proportion of those interviewed said that they had availed themselves of
the services of newsletters to help guide their decisions.



Visiting libraries to review published materials. Some, especially those
who were retired or semi-retired, said they took advantage of public
libraries to access a wide range of publications and databases (e.g.
EDGAR).

3. Most people felt that there was an abundance of information and sources of
information about companies that one could invest in. The participants
seemed to appreciate this abundance, and mostly enjoyed the challenge of
investing wisely. While most felt somewhat uncertain about the health and
direction of the market today, they seemed to be fairly sanguine about the
longer-term prospects for performance.
4. With few exceptions, the information that people focused on in deciding on
buying opportunities did not include the audited financial statements of
companies. Instead, people cited the following kinds of information:


Management’s views and comments about past successes and business
strategy going forward. For people who are considering a long-term
investment in a company’s stock, there is interest in (and often a high
degree of confidence in) the company’s CEO and senior management.
Hence, news stories quoting their views, television interviews, etc, carry
some weight, even though participants perceive that the role of the CEO is
to help boost the stock, and present the company in the most flattering
light possible.
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The stock’s track record of positive performance, combined with a sense
of whether it was currently under-priced given its performance. Despite
warnings (of which people seemed generally aware) there was a strong
tendency to look at the track record of the company, in terms of profit
growth, and at its track record of meeting or exceeding analyst profit-pershare estimates.



The views of analysts about the company’s prospects. In general,
analysts were judged to be pretty expert and more closely aligned with the
interests of average investors than other stakeholders were. There was
little distinction made between buy side and sell side analysts, and no
real consideration of the impartiality of the views of the sell side firm.
Instead, people seemed to rely on the notion that an analyst and their
firm that recommended bad investments would pay a price over time, and
that therefore they would be much more inclined to make sound buy and
sell recommendations.



The general image they have of the company, including any direct
exposure they have to its products and services. At least one or two
people in each group said that they tended to buy companies with which
they had a personal familiarity, as consumers of the company’s products
or services. They said they trusted their instincts about what were good
products and services, and that companies which offered good products
and services were going to do well and therefore have rising share values.

CONSUMERS SEE ABUNDANT, HIGH QUALITY INFORMATION
 Most acknowledge risks, accept longer term case for stocks
 Few rely on audited statements, annual reports
 News coverage much more powerful influence
 Sense that analysts provide useful filter, on consumers’ behalf
 Interest in management views, despite perceived role as stock promoters



In general, most people said they only looked at annual reports after they
became shareholders, and then often only paid them scant attention. If
they did bother to go through them at all, people were more likely to focus
on the MD&A section, rather than look through the audited financial
statements. Those who were using the statements were more likely to be
wondering whether they should be selling the company’s stock than
buying it. It seemed fair to conclude from the nature of the comments
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that few felt they were competent to understand most of what was
contained in the financial statements, and simply looked at revenue and
profit lines over time.


In discussing the various sources of information they used to make
investment decisions, it was clear that people were aware of potential
abuses, but were not particularly of the view that they were exposed to
much risk of financial misstatements and investment misguidance. The
reasons behind this perception will be elaborated on in the next section of
this report.

In summary, the group of investors interviewed in this process thought they were
well served with an abundance of information, from a wide variety of sources.
The annual report of public companies is not a particularly widely used
component, and the audited financial statements seem even less widely
consumed, among the retail investor community.
THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN FINANCIAL INFORMATION
The next stage of the interviews probed the extent to which retail investors felt
that they could trust the information they accessed in making investment
decisions, and the reasons for having greater or lesser levels of trust. The
findings are critical to setting the context for their subsequent views on
objectivity and independence guidelines, and can be summarized as follows:
1. Most people have a high level of trust in the financial information they access
today. While many of those interviewed were familiar with high profile
examples of financial misstatements, the strong tendency was to see these
as isolated incidents. People went on to say that there were bound always to
be such examples, and that investors couldn’t reasonably expect otherwise.
When commenting on these cases, people also said that they felt that it was
probably impossible to prevent people from committing fraud, but that the
system seemed to be working to find it and deal with it post-hoc. They felt
some sympathy for those who had been victimized, but were doubtful that
there were more important systemic issues to be addressed.
2. This high level of trust is particularly interesting because it is not based on
any shared understanding of the safeguards that help ensure the reliability of
financial reporting. Quite the opposite phenomena was in evidence: people
have so much confidence that they don’t think it would be worth bothering to
find out the details of these safeguards, and had never taken the opportunity
to do so in the past.
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CONSUMERS HAVE HIGH DEGREE OF TRUST IN FINANCIAL INFORMATION
 Aware of abuses, but see them as isolated
 Confidence not tied to knowledge of current safeguards
 Assumption that checks and balances exist, are working
 Regulators, analysts, larger investors enforce necessary discipline
 Belief that most people are honest, including auditors and management

3. When asked to explain the reasons for their confidence, a number of reasons
were commonly cited:


An assumption that there were a huge number of checks and balances in
the system, even if they weren’t able to list them in detail. There was a
feeling that the financial system had been in place for a long time, and
was functioning quite well, and that this probably was the best evidence
that their were healthy checks and balances. Related to this was a view
that large investors had much more at stake than the average retail
investor, and that large investors would have forced the necessary
discipline and rule-making to protect their own interests long before.



An assumption that most people were generally honest rather than
dishonest. Despite the acknowledgement that money can bend ethics,
the majority of participants held fairly stubbornly to a positive view of
human behavior. They said that most auditors, with or without a system
of safeguards and codes, would do an honest and objective job, because
that was human nature. Similarly, there was a feeling that most
companies, particularly most big, long established companies would be
inclined to report honestly on their situation, especially if there was any
potential risk of future embarrassment associated with the use of
aggressive accounting methods.



An assumption that the analysts whose views they monitored or followed
would have reviewed and ensured the reliability of the numbers. There
was a clear feeling that analysts knew a great deal about the financial
results of companies, and were probably well suited to spotting overly
aggressive accounting approaches. Related to this was a belief that large
institutional investors were vigilant, and that their presence in the market
helped protect smaller investors from abuses, because they deterred
misrepresentations, and were more likely to spot attempts to manage
numbers.
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When listing the factors contributing to their confidence in financial
reporting, a few participants mentioned the fact that company financial
reports were audited, but for most this seemed to be a somewhat vague
concept. As noted earlier, many investors rarely used annual reports,
usually only after they had become shareholders and were mailed copies.
Among those who did use the reports, the statements were something
they said they “glanced” over.



Roughly half were more or less aware that auditors had reviewed the
reports to ensure that they complied with generally accepted accounting
rules (some had a passing familiarity with this phrase). In general,
participants said that they were much more likely to be paying attention to
quarterly earnings reports, and other intermittent news and information
about a company’s prospects. They did not have any expectations that
this information was audited or verified, but they did not express any real
concern about the accuracy or reliability of the information either.

In summary, most people express a high level of confidence in the accuracy and
reliability of the financial information made available by public companies. They
attribute this reliability to a range of factors, among which the role of auditors is
relatively low profile.
PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITORS AND AUDITS
Participants were then asked to offer their perceptions about the way in which
auditors approached their work, and the way in which audits were conducted.
The results were as follows:
1. Most people had only scant impressions of how audits were conducted;
however their impressions were largely positive in nature. Some said they
had noticed auditors in their workplace, and observed that they seemed
diligent and thorough. Most of those who had not ever had any first hand
experience also seemed to share positive impressions.
2. While few seemed to know much about how audits were done the tendency
was to guess that it involved time-consuming, detailed checking of facts and
figures. They assumed that it cost a significant amount of money to have a
proper audit done, and people seemed to feel that it was money likely well
spent. They assumed that the company had a strong interest in ensuring that
its financial information was accurate, and that auditors were helpful to
management in that respect.

Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board

- 33 -

July 2000

EARNSCLIF FE RESEARCH
& COMMUNI CATI ONS

CONSUMERS KNOW LITTLE ABOUT AUDITS, BUT ASSUME THE BEST
 Done by small number of well known firms, concerned about reputation
 Auditees seen as generally having an interest in accurate financials
 Assumption that auditors are no more or less ethical than others
 Belief that firm matters more than individual qualities, in independence
 Laws, criminal/civil penalties, accounting rules all seen as helpful
 Codes, experience, training and resources all noted as well

3. The common assumption was that audits of major companies were done by a
small number of well-known firms. The names of major audit firms were
familiar to most people once somebody brought them up, but the level of
familiarity was limited. The largest firms, along with the largest public
companies, were generally judged to be more stringent and reliable in their
approaches to financial reporting. Some went so far as to say they would
have doubts about a company that was audited by an “unknown” firm.
4. Most people did not really see auditors as people possessed of unusually
high ethical standards, even though they believed that they were ethical.
They offered the view that most people were honest and ethical, and that
auditors were no more or less ethical than any other group in society. They
did not expect or demand that auditors meet a higher ethical test than other
people were asked to meet.
5. There was a tendency to believe that the audit firm had more to do with the
level of independence and objectivity than the individual auditor did. This
was not to discount the role of the auditor, but really was an expression of
confidence that audit firms were extremely concerned for safeguarding their
reputation, and that if they weren’t the pressures on individual auditors
would be of much more concern. To some degree, people also speculated
that audit staff might often be more junior in rank, less experienced, and
therefore somewhat more vulnerable to pressure. As such, people wanted to
believe, and did, that the audit firms had measures in place to mitigate such
pressures and protect reputation.
6. When asked to list the factors that contributed to auditor objectivity and
independence, the following list of suggestions emerged from participants:


The role of laws, regulations and oversight bodies such as the SEC. While
most of the people in the groups were wary of over-regulation, they
seemed to feel that the level of oversight was appropriate in this field,
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even if they were unfamiliar with the details. The SEC was a familiar
name, and people had a rough idea of what it was meant to do, but there
was no real awareness of its advocacy on issues, including those related
to auditor independence. It was seen as more of a “policing” arm of the
federal government.


The fear of criminal and civil penalties for wrongdoing. People were
aware that companies and their auditors had been sued by investors in
the past, and felt this would happen again in the future. While people
were not enthusiastic about the role of litigation, they did feel that the
threat of financial and other penalties was a helpful deterrent.



The fear of negative publicity and a loss of firm reputation. Even more
than the fear of civil and criminal penalties, participants seemed to think
that the question of reputation mattered a lot in ensuring accurate and
appropriate financial reporting. They reasoned that those who wanted to
be successful in the financial and business arena couldn’t afford to gain a
reputation for misleading investors, and that it was only a small number
who would trade short term gains, for longer -term failure. There was an
unspoken, but clear, assumption that no one could get away with
misstatements over a prolonged period of time. The profile of cases that
participants were aware of made them think that malfeasance was being
caught, rather than assuming that there were many more cases going
unchecked.



The value system of the people involved. Most people sensed that the
value system was a very important part of what made financial reporting
reliable. But it was clear that they were not making a distinction between
the value system of auditors and auditee management, or others.
Instead, they were offering a more blanket assertion that they were
inclined to trust rather than distrust others in society.



The culture within the audit firm. As noted earlier, people didn’t know
much about the culture within audit firms, but they felt that it was an
important part of ensuring objectivity, and they guessed that it was being
properly cultivated, at least among the largest firms. Some appeared to
feel that this aspect of the culture might have deteriorated a little bit over
the years, but only as part of a slight, broader deterioration in societal
commitment to such principles.



The role of “generally accepted” accounting standards. Probably no one
could explain what this term meant in detail, but a fair number had a
general understanding of the concept. Their assumption was that these

Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board

- 35 -

July 2000

EARNSCLIF FE RESEARCH
& COMMUNI CATI ONS

standards, rules or principles served two functions: to make it easier to
identify misstatements, and to make it easier for investors to make
“apples to apples” comparisons when it came to investment choices.


Professional codes of conduct. Without knowing the details, most
participants assumed that auditors followed a detailed and helpful code
of conduct governing the profession. They also imagined that this code
contained sanctions for inappropriate behavior and that these sanctions
worked as a useful deterrent.



Experience of auditors, and their firms. The general view was that the
task of auditing was complicated and likely becoming more complicated
all the time. Consequently, most judged that good auditors needed to
have experience, and needed to be able to draw on experienced support
within their firms. They reasoned that less experienced auditors might be
more susceptible to pressure from auditees, or less certain about how to
respond to it.



Adequate training and resources to do the job well. Most people
assumed that an annual audit was a task that required a significant
commitment of resources, and they guessed that if auditors felt that their
efforts were not properly resourced, they would be less committed to
doing a thorough job. Few had any sense that auditees had put pressure
on audit fees, but when the subject came up in discussion, the tendency
was to believe that this trend could be unhelpful.

7. When asked to list the kinds of factors that might compromise objectivity and
independence, participants suggested the following:


The presence of a financial interest in or dependence on the auditee.
Even though this came up quickly as a potential area for concern, upon
discussion it was clear that people did not perceive a problem of this
nature today. More often, they reasoned that this was a logical matter to
be concerned about, given the role of the auditor on behalf of the
shareholder, and the nature of the audit firm’s business interests and
strategies.



Too close a personal relationship between the auditor and auditee. Here
again, many people felt that this was an area of potential difficulty, not
just in auditing, but in many other business relationships. They said that
there was no simple or perfect answer, but policies that encouraged
sensitivity to the matter were welcomed.
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Pressure by companies to meet or exceed market expectations. Most of
these investors felt that companies were under very intense pressure to
beat analysts earnings estimates or pay a heavy price in terms of stock
valuations. On the whole, people did not seem to think that this was a
problem, although the volatility of stock prices did create some
discomfort. Most reasoned that some companies might react to this
pressure by putting extra pressure on their auditors, but they felt that this
would be the minority, and that the auditors would successfully resist the
pressure, especially if it was on “big” items or issues.

CONSUMERS SEE MANY RISKS TO INDEPENDENCE, BUT CONCERN IS MUTED
 Financial interest, personal relationships, market pressures all noted
 Human nature of small minority seen as most frequent cause
 Prevention and remedial safeguards useful, but won’t always work
 Acceptance that some abuse will happen, consumers must be wary



The human nature of a minority of people. Perhaps more than any other
cause, participants felt that earnings misrepresentation was a function of
a handful of bad people. They said that it was simply inevitable that in
any large population, some would be inclined to act in a fraudulent
manner, and that while prevention and remediation efforts were
necessary, not all attempts would be prevented, and not all cases would
be unearthed. There was a sense that auditors did the best they could to
minimize these risks.

8. Participants were asked whether the “typical” relationship between an
auditor and an auditee was “collegial and professional”, “cool and distant” or
marked by “tension or friction”. Most people felt that it was closer to “cool
and distant” and felt that this was the way it should be. They had no doubt
that there were friendly relationships, especially at the most senior levels of
the two organizations, but they didn’t feel that these compromised the work
that the auditors did. They asserted that the day-to-day contact of the
engagement team with the auditee was probably less than “friendly”, but
they didn’t feel that there was lots of friction or tension.
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MOST ASSUME AUDITOR-AUDITEE RELATIONSHIP APPROPRIATE
 Few have any detailed knowledge, but don’t fear the worst
 Assume companies trying to put best face forward, but rules limit flexibility
 Assume that senior levels are friendly, but not inappropriately so
 Assume day to day contact during audit is cool, but not tense

9. In general, people felt that it was normal for companies to be trying to put the
best face forward in their financial statements, but that the leeway was
reasonably narrow given the accounting rules and the scrutiny of outsiders
including the auditors. They guessed that the circumstances where auditors
were put under intense pressure by the auditees were few and far between,
perhaps more common in new companies, especially technology companies.
In summary, most participants expressed confidence in the way in which auditors
approached their work, believing it to be thorough, competent and objective.
They sensed that there were risks, and identified many of the more widely
debated ones, but they believed that there were counterweights that served to
minimize these risks.
PROBING ON RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS
As the discussion groups progressed, probing began to focus on some of the
core elements of the debate about auditor objectivity and independence, and to
explore these in slightly more detail. Participants were probed about the
potential impact of a number of items on auditor objectivity and independence.
The key findings were as follows:
1. Evolution of audit firms into consulting firms: most people felt that the fact
that accounting firms had branched out into other service areas, in addition
to auditing, posed no challenge to the objectivity and independence which
they brought to auditing. A small handful thought that there might be some
potential improvement in the quality of the work they were doing, as they
gathered a broader array of experience, but most people sensed little
connection.
2. Offering non-audit services to audit clients: this subject provoked a fair bit of
debate and some discomfort among participants. A fair number of people
(almost half) felt that there was something unsettling about the idea of an
audit firm doing additional work for the auditee, but they weren’t sure that
banning this type of activity really made sense. For the most part, people felt
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that the idea of separate consulting and audit divisions as well as other
safeguards would help mitigate any risk. It was clear that while most people
had never really thought about the role of auditors, and were not really
concerned about the reliability of financial information, this specific issue had
the potential to raise some concerns in the minds of a notable minority of
people. Certainly, the impression left was that people would be more
comfortable with a world where this practice did not occur, but that most
people would not demand or press for such a context.
PROVISION OF NON AUDIT SERVICES TO AUDIT CLIENTS UNSETTLES SOME
 Few had considered the question before, views were soft
 Most felt that status quo was probably ok, avoidance would be better
 Walls seen as helpful, but only with other safeguards
 Tone at the top seen as critical, most assume the best

3. Physical/financial separation of business units: The idea of maintaining
physical and financial separation between the audit and non-audit units of
the firm was something that helped provide people with a measure of
assurance. However, it was seen as one of several safeguards that would be
satisfactory in combination, not sufficient on its own. While people had some
doubts that the firms’ divisions would not broach the walls, most people
nevertheless thought it was a worthwhile safeguard.
4. Tone at the top: It was interesting to note that most people sensed that this
was a very important part of ensuring objectivity and independence. They
believe that strong signals from senior management have an impact today,
provided that incentives and penalties are aligned with the sentiments
expressed. Moreover, people felt that objectivity and independence had
more to do with the determination of the firm to safeguard its reputation,
than with the instincts and ethics of an individual auditor. While almost
nobody had any information about tone in major accounting firms today, they
judged that the right signals were being sent, because of the firm’s need to
protect its reputation.
5. Competition among audit firms: There was a vague sense that audit firms
were more competitive with one another than might have been the case in
the past, but this was seen as no different from what had been occurring in
other sectors of the economy. Few put any credence in the notion that this
heightened competition was having any impact on objectivity and
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independence. People grasped the theoretical pressure that could arise, but
they doubted it arose often, and assumed that the firms’ concern for
reputation would override any such pressure.
6. More disclosure of safeguards: people thought that it couldn’t really do any
harm for the various stakeholders involved to expend more effort to inform
investors about the role of the audit, the auditor, and the independence
safeguards. At the same time, it was clear that to some degree this was a
pro-forma answer: few could ever imagine that they would notice this
information, or go out of their way to discover it. They certainly felt that any
publicity or advertising about this subject would go largely unnoticed and
would be a waste of money, but they felt that stipulations in an annual report
would probably be slightly helpful.
FEW KNOW ABOUT SAFEGUARDS, INTEREST IN SUBJECT IS MUTED
 Most were impressed with present safeguards
 As people learned more, confidence rose
 More disclosure of non-audit work generally valued as a deterrent
 Some doubts about effectiveness of Audit Committees

7. Disclosure of non-audit work: while the level of concern about auditors doing
non-audit work for their audit clients was modest, most people liked the idea
of requiring companies to disclose such activity. This was a slightly tentative
response, since people maintained their assertion that they generally trusted
the stakeholders involved and didn’t want to set in place cumbersome
regulations that implied a higher level of mistrust.
On balance though, after discussing the matter a little, there was a feeling
that disclosure might be a relatively painless way for companies to meet a
perception test, and might serve as a deterrent to the minority that might act
inappropriately. The deterrent, they reasoned, would not lie in the fact that
the average retail investor would note the information and respond
accordingly, but that the institutional investors and analysts would take the
lead.
8. Peer review procedures: most people were surprised to learn of the peer
review procedures in place, and a considerable minority thought they were
vaguely inappropriate. Their was a sense that the safeguard was perhaps
unnecessary “overkill” in terms of protection for investors, and an intrusion
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into reasonable privacy that could be expected by the audit firm and the
company being audited.
Some sensed that having your competitor review your work was an invitation
to other types of trouble, even as it might help address questions about
objectivity. After discussion, it was apparent that most people didn’t really
have strong views about the procedure, and were ready to accept the idea
that it probably was acceptable, since audit firms seemed to be comfortable
with the idea.
9. Second partner review: Even though people recognized that second partner
review was a concept that could be compromised, since both partners
worked for the same company, there was a broad view that it was a helpful
procedure. Because people accepted that the firm wanted to protect its
reputation, they accepted the notion that the firm would ask a second partner
to help ensure the protection of that reputation, and they further accepted
the fact that the second partner would play his or her assigned role properly.
10. Required partner rotation: There was virtually unanimous approval for this
procedure. While almost no one had been aware that it existed, almost
everyone felt that it was a useful safeguard, and the only debate centered on
whether 7 years was an appropriate time frame. Some thought it might be a
little long, and wondered if five years might be better, but everyone accepted
the notion that it was in everyone’s interest to have an auditor become
experienced in doing a company’s audit, and have a period of time after that
for the full benefits of that experience to be realized, before making a
change.
In endorsing this safeguard, it is important to note that people did not believe
that the typical auditor would lose objectivity over time, but that it was more
likely that familiarity would contribute to a slight lowering of vigilance, even if
in no way deliberate or conscious. Many people related it to their own work,
and said that the more familiar they became with some of their own work
assignments, the more their guard might come down from time to time.
11. Stepped up role for the Audit Committee: while this idea was generally well
regarded by elite audiences, it was met with a bit of indifference by the retail
investors. On the whole, after discussion, they thought that it would be
helpful, but this conclusion was by no means automatic, nor particularly
enthusiastic. This reaction is mostly explained by the nature of the
perceptions participants voiced about boards of directors. Some saw board
members as “captive” or “friends” of management, and they doubted that
they would do much to upset an inappropriate relationship between auditor
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and auditee management. Others saw board members as not really close
enough to the operations of the company to be a useful intervenor in such
matters.
12. Rules regarding investment: There was a vague awareness of the fact that
there were rules prohibiting investments by audit firm personnel in the
companies which the firm audited. Most people assumed that these were
sensible precautions, but after more detailed discussions about the nature of
these prohibitions, as many as a third to a half felt that they might be
excessively strict. The rest maintained that even if they were overly strict, it
might be best to keep them intact as it conveyed a tone and a principle that
were important.
13. Rules regarding relationships: Participants had a similar view on the
safeguards that related to relationships. On the one hand, there was a sense
that they might be too rigid, but even though people had a high degree of
confidence in human nature, they were somewhat reluctant to see too much
loosening of any safeguards.
14. Incentive compensation: Participants were asked about two concepts: the
idea that relationship growth should be one factor affecting the
compensation of auditors, and the idea that independent and objective
audits should be rewarded in compensation discussions. On the first
question, most participants were decidedly uncomfortable with the idea that
audit partners should receive any financial benefit when their firm sold more
services to an auditee. They felt that even if the amount was small, and even
if relationship growth was only one component of many that affected
compensation, there was a problem with the principle.
On the second matter, people seemed to think it quite logical that auditors
should be compensated for being objective and independent, but they were a bit
quizzical about why or how “exceptional” performance in this area should be
singled out and rewarded. For some, it seemed as though auditors whose work
was lacking in objectivity should not be auditors, rather than remain auditors, but
be paid less than others. On balance, people had no major problems with this
idea, but didn’t immediately grasp the “upside” because they didn’t really have a
concern about the motivation or performance of auditors to begin with.
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E. CONCLUSION

We believe it is possible to draw several conclusions based on these findings, and
would focus attention on the following:
Elite Audiences
1. The addition of another 50 interviews to the roughly 120 conducted in the first
phase should serve to bolster confidence in the results reported last year, since
many of the broad findings were confirmed. While the work remains essentially
qualitative, we believe that the findings are highly reliable.
2. Most of those interviewed feel very confident with the general standard of
financial reporting and believe that auditors perform a necessary function in a
way that reflects integrity, competence, and independence. Worries abound,
however, that the perception of the independence of the auditor is under
increasing pressure, caused by broader participation and heightened media
coverage of market events.
3. Most feel that the pressure to meet earnings expectations is huge and growing,
but that earnings management is not new, is often overstated, is largely
manageable, and rarely has anything to do with the role of auditors per se. The
one major exception is in the technology sector, and in particular with respect to
new players in that sector, where the room for interpretation is broad, the
financial expertise within companies often thin, and the risks and rewards huge.
4. The size of the audit firm and the size of the auditee are not seen as linked to
independence and objectivity in any significant way, except in the case (more
theoretical than real) of a mismatch between a huge client and a smaller audit
firm, and where technology related start ups are involved (but the real issue there
is less size than the nature of the business).
5. Perceptions of independence are seen as critical, but there is little consensus as
to how best to safeguard perception, whose perceptions should matter, and what
cost should be entailed to achieve this objective. No one believes that perception
challenges can be solved easily, or by one set of measures. Instead, there is a
tendency to favor a combination of efforts:


A greater degree of separation of consulting and audit side services.



An increasing reliance on disclosure of the range and nature of the
relationship between auditors and auditees.



A strengthened oversight role for audit committees.
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Increasing reliance on the tone set at the top of audit firms and the internal
governance and compensation procedures to model appropriately
independent behavior.

6. Most are of the view that independence safeguards probably require some
change, to deal with the evolution of the economy and the structure of the
accounting industry. However the instinct for change was not borne of
widespread, urgent anxiety, but more a sense of prudence and vigilance. In this
sample, auditors were least likely to feel a need for change, and analysts were
most likely to take the opposite approach.
7. Most feel that the ideal standards and safeguards should reflect a combination
of anticipation and avoidance, mitigation and management of issues that arise,
and tough penalties. The tilt would be towards mitigation and management,
combined with penalties that are tough enough to act as real deterrents, because
of concerns that an over-reliance on “anticipation and avoidance” can become
too burdensome and ultimately counterproductive.
Investing Public
1. Most had a high degree of confidence in the quality and reliability of the
information that was available for them to use in making investment decisions.
They used a wide variety of sources, assumed that all of them contained some
degree of bias, and felt that they were capable of recognizing and factoring in
these biases.
2. Their confidence in the financial reporting system was largely based on the
feeling that while the potential for abuse and fraud exists, there are many checks
and balances that help keep the risk to an acceptable level, and that the vast
majority of people were more inclined to be honest than dishonest, even when
money was involved.
3. The tendency was to see the role of the audit and auditors as one of many
checks. Few had any detailed knowledge of what an audit consisted of, or the
safeguards to ensure that it was done in an independent fashion, but the
tendency was to assume that auditors and auditees, more often than not, shared
a desire to present accurate financial information.
4. Few consumed the annual reports of companies they were considering investing
in, and even fewer waded into the audited financial statements. Annual reports
were more likely to be used to assess selling opportunities than buying
opportunities, and the MD&A sections were more heavily relied on than any
other. The fact that auditors had reviewed the financials gave people comfort,
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but there was no underlying sense of insecurity, despite the fact that most people
could name some high profile problem cases in recent years.
5. Very few people knew anything about the current safeguards to ensure
independence on the part of the auditor, although they assumed that rules, fear
of penalties, codes, etc. all formed part of the system. The more people became
informed about current safeguards, the more confident they became in the
independence of the auditor. They were open to the idea that more safeguards
might be needed, but were not agitating for these, nor were they overly interested
in being communicated to about these matters in the future.
6. Most people sensed that the relationship between auditor and auditee was
appropriate, typically neither too close nor tension-ridden. The one area of
greater concern had to do with the provision of non-audit service to audit clients,
where participants felt unsettled and discomfited. Avoidance of this practice
seemed to be preferred, but disclosure was seen as a helpful alternative step as
well.
7. Inherent in many of these comments was an acceptance of the fact of life that
the relationship between the auditor and auditee could become corrupted, but
that made it no different from a wide variety of other situations in which people
place their trust everyday. In short, they were saying that they felt that the level of
risk was modest, the track record was pretty good, and the checks and balances
seemed to be appropriate and functioning reasonably well. Clearly, people would
not argue against more safeguarding, but neither was this sample agitating for
more protection.
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APPENDIX A: TESTING SPECIFIC SCENARIOS WITH ELITE AUDIENCES
In the course of conducting these interviews, a number of scenarios were developed
for use in focussing attention on the kinds of practical situations in which an
independence issue might or might not arise. These scenarios, and the responses
which they generated, are summarized here. Because of the complexity of these
scenarios in the minds of the individual investor, they were not used extensively in
the focus groups, and so the responses below are those of the elite one-on-one
interviewees.
SCENARIO I
ABC audit firm’s consulting division takes a two year contract to develop and install a new
SAP computer system for their client, ACME Manufacturing. ABC earns $10 million for the
computer system work, and $1 million per year for their audit of ACME. The consulting
contract equals about 1% of ABC’s annual revenues.
ABC has recognized expertise in computer consulting, won the contract in competitive
bidding, and the question of whether such a contract would impact the independence was
raised with ACME’s audit committee, which decided that there was no impairment. ACME
management has the necessary expertise to monitor the consulting work, and make the
necessary decisions around it.

As with the first phase of research, the vast majority of interviewees did not perceive
a real loss of independence in this situation. But probably almost half felt that there
was a risk of impairment, and certainly a risk of perceived impairment. A number of
factors would affect the level of risk.


The sheer size of the contract was seen as a potential perception challenge.
While $10 million might be good value, observers might doubt that the audit firm
would be willing to walk away from such a relationship, if necessary to protect the
integrity of the audit.



The proportion of firm, office or partner income in relation to total billings to any
single client was seen as relevant in real and perception terms.



The role played by the audit partner was deemed important: most felt that the
auditor’s participation should stop at introduction.



The procurement process, including whether a competition was held, the Audit
Committee was involved, and disclosure of the assignment is made.
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When asked to consider the same scenario where the consulting contract
equaled 20%, rather than 1%, of the audit firm’s revenues (or the consulting
arm’s revenues), most agreed that there would be both a significant degree of
real and perceived risk. Many suggested that a materiality matrix would be a
useful tool for both management and audit committees in measuring risk.



Respondents in this phase were less confident in the ability of internal
safeguards such as “Chinese walls”, or firewalls to minimize risk. Auditees felt
that they could probably mitigate risks with additional disclosure and oversight
although they preferred not to want to do this very often. Analysts shared
concerns about the size and nature of the assignment, and felt current
safeguards offer little or no guarantee of independence. They were much more
likely to push for disclosure as the best deterrent safeguard.



Increasing numbers of interviewees in this phase of research felt nothing short of
a strict separation of the audit and consulting services would really mitigate the
risk in such a situation. They differed in how plausible or important they thought
this to be.

SCENARIO II
John Doe, an auditor with the accounting firm BBB, has just completed his annual audit of
Kate Microchips Inc. Kate Inc, then offers Doe the position of Chief Strategy Officer, with a
rich compensation package. Doe accepts, and his new position means that he is in regular
contact with brokerage firms and their analysts, working to strengthen confidence in Kate.
BBB immediately conducts a thorough review of the most recent audit of Kate, makes sure it
selects a senior partner to work on Kate’s audit in the future, to ensure proper skepticism,
and schedules QA and Peer Review inspections for next year.



As was the case in the last wave of research, an overwhelming majority of
respondents saw neither a real loss of independence nor an unacceptable risk to
auditor independence in the future.



Most also agreed that the perception of reasonable investors would not be
negatively affected in this situation, that this type of situation is highly common
and quite productive from the standpoint of both the audit firm and the client.



Respondents were satisfied that the procedures taken by the individual and the
audit firm were effective and important.
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SCENARIO III
Ace Accounting does the audit work for Moll Computer Warehouse, based in New York. Ace’s
Seattle office does some routine bookkeeping work for Moll’s four Seattle stores, which
account for no more than 4% of Moll’s overall revenues, and would not normally be visited by
an audit team.
The bookkeeping work is done by an “accounting assistance” department of the Ace’ local
office, which is separate from the audit department. The work includes processing companysupplied data, and then forwarded it to Moll’s headquarters in New York. Ace personnel do
not sign checks, have custody of assets or make significant judgements.



As with the last phase of research, there was a clear lack of consensus about this
scenario. Most again agreed that it probably did not pose a real problem of
independence, but many worried that the question of bookkeeping assistance
can be a difficult one which posed real risks to independence.



A number expressed concern that while this specific scenario was probably fine,
similar activities could cause a shifting of management’s responsibilities to the
audit firm, which was unacceptable.



There was a feeling that even if the work did not involve “significant” judgements,
outside observers might doubt the auditor’s independence, if the firm’s staff was
implementing accounting treatments which were likely to be a subject of dispute
with the auditor down the road.



Auditors confirmed again that their firms prefer not to do any of this type of work
because of concerns about how it might be perceived. They felt that even if they
could make the case about the routine and non-judgmental nature of the work,
that participating in any aspect of internal accounting was better avoided.
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SCENARIO IV
Jane Smith works as a senior audit partner with Tendy Accounting’s Boston office. She has
two relatives who happen to work for two different Tendy clients.
Jane’s husband works for Able Inc. as a software developer. He has $8000 in Able’s stock
option plan. Jane and her husband earn a combined income of more than $200,000 per
year. Able’s audit is done by Tendy.
Jane’s brother is the CFO of Simple Internet Services, a small, but rapidly growing company in
Portland Maine. Portland is 120 miles from Boston, and all services for Simple are provided
by Tendy’s Portland office.
Jane has no involvement in either client’s account. She sees her brother socially about once
a year.



Responses to this scenario were virtually identical to our last phase of research.
Once again it provoked a remarkably vigorous discussion.



Interviewees overwhelmingly sensed that no real impairment of independence
had occurred with respect to either the brother or the husband. Most felt that the
relationship and distance rules should have significance only if Jane was involved
in the audit itself. But at the same time, respondents acknowledged that the
perception issues were critical to Jane’s reputation, that of her firm, its clients,
and the perceived integrity of the audits.



There was a widespread feeling current rules governing relationships are quite
strict and may create an impediment to attracting and retaining new entrants to
the profession. This was especially true for interviewees who were involved with
a “new economy” companies, particularly within the technology sector where
stock options have become the main currency of employee compensation.



Some argued that they simply would not take the risk, since even “gray issues”
can be problematic. They felt that it was only appropriate that auditors be held to
a higher standard than other participants in the financial community are, given
the attestation function they perform. They felt that any relaxation of rules, even
admittedly archaic ones, might be perceived as a weakening of the commitment
to independence.



The majority felt that application of sound personal judgement by the auditor was
the best assurance of a high degree of independence when it came to personal
relationships. Most people were of the view that there was no substitute for
general principles of conduct applied with personal judgement.

Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board

- 49 -

July 2000

EARNSCLIF FE RESEARCH
& COMMUNI CATI ONS



Most people felt the auditor had a strong obligation to disclose any potential (real
or perceived) conflict arising from personal relationships not just to their own firm
but to their clients as well and that in these instances, “transparency” was the
only meaningful protection. The overriding assumption is that once disclosed,
these relationship issues could be assessed on a case by case basis to
determine whether they offended either the shareholders or management sense
of propriety.



In an age of jet travel and instant Internet access, many interviewees signaled
that the comfort provided by geographic separation was diminishing over time
and that “distance rules” per se were meaningless. Not surprisingly, this was
particularly true for interviewees drawn from the technology sector.

In summary, four scenarios were tested which explored a number of contemporary
dimensions of the question of auditor independence. In all but one case, there were
mixed opinions, and a lack of consistency in how participants felt current guidelines
could or would normally be applied. This underscored a call for greater clarification
and a hope for greater consistency over time, in how auditors and their clients set
and meet the tests of independence. This degree of uncertainty was highest when
significant consulting relationships were at stake, and when personal relationships
were involved.
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APPENDIX B: THE FOCUS GROUP GUIDE
Can you tell me a little bit about how you decide what stocks to buy or sell, how much information
you gather, what kinds of information do you use, and how do you get it?
What is your overall impression of the information that companies make available to investors? Is
there enough, is it clear enough, is it information that you can trust?
Can you talk to me about whether you use annual reports, and in particular, whether you examine
the audited financial statements of the companies you consider buying or selling?
What are your impressions about the audited financial statements?
What is your impression about the role that auditors play?
Is it your impression or understanding that auditors are independent and objective in carrying out
their audits of companies whose stock is publicly traded?
Why do you think that?
What factors do you think are most helpful in ensuring that they are independent and objective?
What factors do you think could have the potential to put that independence at risk?
Are you familiar with the policies and procedures, often referred to as safeguards, which are in
place to help ensure objectivity and independence.
Do you believe that there are many situations that develop where independence is compromised?
Can you describe any for me?
Do you think independence has more to do with the auditing firm or more to do with the individual
auditor working within the firm?
Do you think that companies being audited tend to put pressure on their auditors in a way that
could compromise independence, or do you think most companies tend to value the idea of
having a truly independent audit to share with potential investors?
What impact, if any, are/could the following things have on the independence and objectivity of
auditors? (Explain how they would have an impact if you think that they would?)


The fact that audit firms generally now provide more consulting services in addition to doing
audits, compared to the past.



The fact that audit firms sometimes now provide consulting services to their audit clients.



The competition for investment among companies



The way in which prices for stocks can be volatile lot based on whether the company exceeds
or falls short of estimates of its earnings.



The quality of the people doing the audits



The values of the people doing the audits



The reputation of the firms doing the audits



The scrutiny of regulatory authorities



The business culture within audit firms



The business culture within client firms
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The competition among audit firms



The concern among audit firms of liability if their audit proves in error.



The concern among audit firms of adverse publicity

In developing approaches to ensure auditor independence and objectivity, is it better to focus on:


Identifying situations which could be threats to independence and make sure that those
circumstances are avoided.



Make sure that in those situations which have the potential to be threats to independence
there are safeguards to make sure that independence is maintained



Making sure that there are strong penalties when independence is compromised.

In your opinion, should the goal be to:


Ensure that reasonable people would not perceive a loss of independence, regardless of
whether there has been one in fact, in order to maintain investor confidence in financial
reporting



Ensure that no loss of independence has actually occurred, because it is impossible to
completely guard against what perceptions people might have, or at least impossible to do so
at a reasonable cost.

Based on what you know, are current safeguards and prohibitions governing the relationship
between audit firms and their clients appropriate or in need of change?
Here are some examples of safeguards which are or could be used to help ensure independence.
Would you comment on the usefulness of each. (Plain language explanations will be offered for
each)


Physical separation/financial separation of audit and non audit services



Employee compensation that rewards the performance of quality audits



Stepped up role for Audit Committee



Disclosure to the public of independence safeguards and procedures



Tone at the top, leadership within firms



Required rotation of the audit partner every seven years.



Second partner review



Peer review procedures



Rules governing relationships



Rules governing investments



Controls within the firms, such as widespread policies, education, monitoring systems and
consulting.

Are there any other comments that you would like to make before we wrap up?
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APPENDIX C: THE INTERVIEW GUIDE

CONTEXT
In general terms, how would you characterize the quality and reliability of information shared by
public companies with the investing public? How has it changed? What caused it to change?
How would you describe the relationship between most auditors and their audit clients? What
about your approach?

AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Have you personally observed situations where the objectivity or independence of an auditor was
impaired, or might be perceived as impaired?
What are the circumstances or factors which are most likely to contribute to an independence
concern?
Is impairment of independence becoming more common or more rare? What impact, if any are
these factors having? (Probes: the change in the balance of auditing versus consulting services
provided by accounting firms, financial markets changing, technology, competition for capital,
the cost of capital, consolidation, rules, regulations, safeguards, earnings management, analysts
estimates, etc.)
If one assumes that a guarantee of absolute independence is not possible, and a lack of
independence is unacceptable, how important do you think it is for the standard setters to focus
on each of the following?


On ensuring that circumstances which are threats to independence are avoided.



On ensuring that appropriate safeguards exist to manage those threats successfully.



How much emphasis do you think needs to be placed on preventive measures versus
sanctions or penalties.

In your opinion, should standards focus on the goal of:


Ensuring that no reasonable person might perceive a loss of independence, regardless of
whether there has been one in fact. (in order to maintain confidence in financial reporting)



Ensuring that no loss of independence has actually occurred. (Because a perception burden
in some cases, or among some people, may be impossible to meet, or impossible to meet at
a reasonable cost)

Do you think that the standards should be set on the basis of assuming that the point of audits is
to ensure that financial statements are reliable, or that they are credible or both? How should
auditors and clients balance these priorities, and what is the role of standards in finding this
balance?
Based on what you know, are current safeguards and prohibitions governing the relationship
between audit firms and their clients appropriate or in need of change?
Thinking specifically about the field of business which your company is involved in, are there
circumstances which you think pose a particular challenge in terms of maintaining a properly
independent relationship between client and auditor. (For example are there services or business

Report to the U.S. Independence Standards Board

- 53 -

July 2000

EARNSCLIF FE RESEARCH
& COMMUNI CATI ONS

arrangements which your audit firm offers which might be appealing to your business, or to the
firm’s clients, but might be perceived, correctly or incorrectly, as an independence issue? Are
there specific safeguards which exist or are needed for this particular sector?
I’d also like to know whether you feel that the question of auditor independence is any different for
companies which are mid-cap in size rather than large cap. Can you describe any differences you
see, and how they are taken into account in properly managing the auditor client relationship?

In responding to the issues which we have just discussed, do you favor a bright lines, broad
guidance, or a best practices approach, and why:
Here are some examples of safeguards which are used to help ensure independence. Would you
comment on the usefulness of each.


Physical separation/financial separation of audit and non audit services



Stepped up role for Audit Committee



Disclosure to the public of independence safeguards and procedures



Tone at the top, leadership within firms



Internal review and governance procedures within audit firms and within the profession

Other comments/thoughts:

SCENARIO A
ABC audit firm’s consulting division takes a two year contract to develop and install a new SAP
computer system for their client, ACME Manufacturing. ABC earns $10 million for the computer
system work, and $1 million per year for their audit of ACME. The consulting contract equals
about 1% of ABC’s annual revenues.

ABC has recognized expertise in computer consulting, won the contract in competitive bidding,
and the question of whether such a contract would impact the independence was raised with
ACME’s audit committee, which decided that there was no impairment. ACME management has
the necessary expertise to monitor the consulting work, and make the necessary decisions around
it.


In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?



If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be impaired?



Might reasonable investors, upon learning of these facts, mistrust the financial reporting of
ACME? Of the reliability of audited statements more generally?



Would your views change if the consulting contract equaled about 20% instead of 1% of
ABC’s revenues? Why/Why not?



Would your views change if the audit partner helped win this consulting contract, and as a
result, is it likely to have a positive impact on the audit partner’s compensation by ABC?

SCENARIO B
John Doe, an auditor with the accounting firm BBB, has just completed his annual audit of Kate
Microchips Inc. Kate Inc, then offers Doe the position of Chief Strategy Officer, with a rich
compensation package. Doe accepts, and his new position means that he is in regular contact
with brokerage firms and their analysts, working to strengthen confidence in Kate.
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BBB immediately conducts a thorough review of the most recent audit of Kate, makes sure it
selects a senior partner to work on Kate’s audit in the future, to ensure proper skepticism, and
schedules QA and Peer Review inspections for next year.


In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?



If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be impaired?



Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts, mistrust the financial
reporting of Kate Inc.? Of the reliability of audited statements more generally?



Would your views change if John Doe turned down the job, and continued working on Kate’s
audits?



Are there other things, preventive or remedial, which could or should have been done in this
scenario?
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SCENARIO C
Ace Accounting does the audit work for Moll Computer Warehouse, based in New York. Ace’s
Seattle office does some routine bookkeeping work for Moll’s four Seattle stores, which account
for no more than 4% of Moll’s overall revenues, and would not normally be visited by an audit
team.
The bookkeeping work is done by an “accounting assistance” department of the Ace’ local office,
which is separate from the audit department. The work includes processing company-supplied
data, and then forwarded it to Moll’s headquarters in New York. Ace personnel do not sign
checks, have custody of assets or make significant judgements.


In your view, do the actions taken in this scenario abide by or contravene current rules?



In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?



If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be impaired?



Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts, mistrust the financial
reporting of Moll Computer Warehouse? Of audited statements more generally?



Would your views change if the stores which received the accounting assistance from ACE
accounted for about 20% instead of 4% of Moll’s revenues? Why/Why not?

SCENARIO D
Jane Smith works as a senior audit partner with Tendy Accounting’s Boston office. She has two
relatives who happen to work for two different Tendy clients.
Jane’s husband works for Able Inc. as a software developer. He has $8000 in Able’s stock option
plan. Jane and her husband earn a combined income of more than $200,000 per year. Able’s
audit is done by Tendy.
Jane’s brother is the CFO of Simple Internet Services, a small, but rapidly growing company in
Portland Maine. Portland is 120 miles from Boston, and all services for Simple are provided by
Tendy’s Portland office.
Jane has no involvement in either client’s account. She sees her brother socially about once a
year.


In this example, has there been a real loss of independence?



If not, ask, is there an unacceptable risk that independence could be impaired?



Is it likely that reasonable investors might, upon learning of these facts, mistrust the financial
reporting of either Able or Simple? Of the reliability of audited statements more generally?



Would your views change if Jane’s brother called her regularly for advice about investments
and personal money management?



Would your views change if Jane Smith provided some consulting work, but no auditing
services to Able?
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Senior Chairman
The Vanguard Group, Inc.
Stephen G. Butler, CPA
Chairman and CEO
KPMG LLP
Robert E. Denham
Partner
Munger, Tolles & Olsen LLP
Manuel H. Johnson
Co-Chairman and
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Johnson Smick
International
Philip A. Laskawy, CPA
Chairman and CEO
Ernst & Young LLP
Barry C. Melancon, CPA
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James J. Schiro, CPA
Chief Executive Officer
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

STAFF

Arthur Siegel, CPA
Executive Director
Richard H. Towers, CPA
Technical Director
Susan McGrath, CPA
Director

Dear ______:
I am writing to ask you to contribute half an hour of your time to an important
research effort.
The Independence Standards Board (ISB) was established by the Securities and
Exchange Commission to provide and maintain independence standards for auditors
of public companies. As part of its mandate, the ISB has commissioned Earnscliffe
Research and Communications to conduct a small number of interviews among the
most senior executives in a variety of business fields. Earnscliffe is a firm highly
experienced at conducting this type of research.
Attached please find a letter of request from Earnscliffe for an interview. The
subject of the interview will be your views on how well auditor independence is
maintained today, and how best to ensure auditor independence in the future. The
views of those who agree to participate will be reported without attribution. The
findings will be used to help shape the agenda for the ISB in the years to come.
These interviews are ideally conducted in person, however if an in person interview
is impossible, a telephone interview can also be arranged. Every effort will be made
to do the interview at a time and in a location convenient for you.
We very much appreciate the challenge of finding a half an hour to spare, and hope
that you will give this request favorable consideration. If you would like to know
more about the research or have any other questions, please do not hesitate to
contact Art Siegel, Executive Director of the ISB at (212) 596-6141.
Sincerely,

William J. Cashin Jr., CPA,
CFA
Project Director
Christine Bricker
Assistant Technical Director

William T. Allen
Chairman
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February 7, 2000

Dear _______:
Earnscliffe Research and Communications has been retained by the Independence
Standards Board (ISB) to conduct a number of research interviews with a sample of
very senior people in various business fields.
Further to the letter from the Chairman of the ISB, we are writing to ask if it would be
possible to arrange an interview. Roughly one half hour of your time would be
required. The subject would be your views on how well auditor independence is
maintained today, and how best to ensure auditor independence in the future.
As is customary with this type of research, the views of those who agree to participate
will be reported without attribution. The findings will be used to help shape the
agenda for the ISB in the years to come.
Elizabeth Nickolas of my office will be in touch to follow up on this letter in the next
day or two. We very much hope you will be able to find the time to share your views,
and every effort will be made to conduct the interview at a time and a location
convenient to you. If you would like more information before considering this
request, please do not hesitate to contact me at (613) 233-8080 or Art Siegel,
Executive Director of the ISB at (212) 596-6141.
Sincerely,

Bruce Anderson
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